Disasters derail development. Why aren’t we doing more integration?
You know all the facts and figures. Disasters are increasing in number
and intensity, climate change is making them even more unpredictable,
and a major catastrophe can wipe out decades of development gains
overnight. We, the global development community, have got to do
something about it. Design our programmes in a way that leaves people
less exposed to disaster and climate risk, perhaps even try to prevent
some of the worst effects. It’s that simple, right?
Wrong.
Everyone agrees that we have a moral obligation to deal with risk, and
that it makes sound business sense to protect hundreds of millions of
dollars of investment in development from a 40 second earthquake. But
doing something about it – as the
Advancing Integration programme has found – is much harder than it
looks.
How can development agencies, who in
Busan reaffirmed their commitment to align to partner country
objectives, work to reduce climate, environment and disaster risks if
these risks are not prioritised by partner countries? Where do donors go
to talk about disaster risk – given that there are no Ministries of
Disasters? What to do when whole cultures think that disasters are ‘acts
of god’ and shrug off active risk management? Even obtaining accurate
information about risks can be problematic, especially at local level –
where do you go to find information about environmental degradation or
climate change impacts on a small rural community?
Creating the
right incentives will be critical to overcoming these challenges.
The hint of potential new donor funding – as the study found in
Vanuatu – can help shift policy priorities. Civil society
organisations can be a powerful partner for changing public and
political attitudes towards risks. Shrewd timing of messages can also
help; the devastating
2005 Indian Ocean tsunami put
disaster
preparedness firmly on the agenda of everyone living or
working in that area.
Even within donor organisations, there are
challenges and disincentives that cramp coherent risk reduction
programming. Donors, who often make programming decisions in far-away
capitals, are unlikely to be aware of the catastrophic effects that
landslides may have on remote communities. The ready availability of
humanitarian funding may also have perverse effects; people are unlikely
to invest in risk reduction measures if they know that humanitarians
will come to their rescue in times of crisis.
How to get over this? There has to be
a way for donors, both at political and programming level, to feel
responsible for risk reduction. Risk reduction actions – against natural
hazards, geo-political risks and economic shocks – must become more
coherent.
Making sure that climate and disaster risk are properly
embedded in the post-2015 development framework, and that there is
consistency between what donors sign up to in the
second Hyogo Framework for Action on disaster risk reduction, the
“new”
sustainable development goals and the agreement on climate planned
for Paris’s
COP 21, will be an important step. Working out who is responsible
for what – and holding donors accountable for those commitments – will
help send the right signals to those who set strategic directions and
allocate funds.
Sharing risk information between donors, and promoting synergies
between climate, disaster, development and humanitarian actors, will
also be important. The
Global
Partnership for Effective Co-operation – which brings together
nations, businesses and development organisations – could be a very
useful vehicle for taking this forward.
And what about the
challenges inside donor agencies? An Overseas Development Institute
(ODI) and Australia
Reflections and Lessons study has highlighted the need for senior
management support, organisational integration, inclusion in high-level
policies, action plans, and methods for learning and dissemination.
These things are of course important. Experiences in other donors,
for example on
Ireland’s long road to adopting
resilience as an overarching programme goal, demonstrate the need
for a full change management process; starting with political will and
strategic guidance, but also highlighting the need for new, flexible
programming instruments and changes to the way the institution
approaches innovation, results management and human resources.
Different bits of donors have different programming cycles and
timeframes; these need to be harmonised. Donor staff often see risk as
“complicated” – with the exception of certain front-running donors like
Japan, it is tough to find a water engineer who understands the
finer points of disaster risk. There is often pressure to design large
“scaled up” development programmes – but this may hamper efforts to
mitigate risks at community level. And donors may just be risk
intolerant – a number of DAC donors, including Australia and the UK, are
under intensive scrutiny from the domestic press; this may make them shy
away from more risky ways of working.
Of course, there are ways
around this. Focusing on implementation in the field – where staff is
likely to be more pragmatic and have a better understanding of risks –
might be a good first step. Seed funding for risk assessments – such as
that
provided by Australia to national risk management structures in the
Philippines – can also be very useful. Ensuring that staff has
adequate training and appropriate career incentives, will also help. And
results targets and monitoring systems should be set up to encourage
staff to work on risk and uncertainty – rather than guiding them towards
certain results and value for money. Here, the guidance
from ODI is welcome.
Yes, we all know that we have to do
something about disaster, environment and climate risk. But getting from
the moral imperative to effective joined-up risk reduction programming
will require the right incentives, and some major changes to the way
donors work. Let’s all encourage them to take those steps.