The Marginalization of Disaster Response Institutions: The 1997-1998 El Ni–o Experience in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. Richard Stuart Olson, Juan Pablo Sarmiento Prieto, Robert A. Olson, Vincent T. Gawronski and Amelia Estrada, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado, Special Publication 36, 2000. 43 pages. Available in English at http://www.colorado.edu/hazards and in Spanish at http://www.crid.or.cr.

This report is a bombshell! It openly criticizes the behavior of the governments of the three countries concerned, and demonstrates with considerable clarity that the reactions to an El Ni–o threat in these countries are more political than climatic. And it minces no words in asserting that "next time" will be no different. The Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center of the University of Colorado produced the report and assumes full responsibility for its content. One must wonder how far it will penetrate into the higher echelons of the governments of which it is so critical. Will it simply be dismissed as an irrelevancy from a research body with little or no application to the realities of institutional and political power struggles? The Marginalization of Disaster Response Institutions forces us to recognize that in these countries, nothing much will happen until the next ENSO, but also that when it does occur, ad hoc attempts to counter it will be based primarily on factors that are not meteorological, hydrological or climatic. And they will be independent of the intensity of the event and almost certainly even less predictable.

The following factors may or may not, in different countries, have a profound influence on the response to a predicted ENSO event:
(a) political
(b) socio-economic (including agricultural)
(c) meteorological (including hydrological and climatic)
(d) other imponderables

For (a), how does one assess the probable influence of politics at a given time and its relationship to the expected intensity of the event. There is an obvious need for in-depth studies of warm and cold ENSO events to acquire a better understanding of their socio-economic impact (b) at different intensity levels. Food production is an important example of the need to adapt policies and practices in both defensive and aggressive ways.

Little has been done in the most severely affected countries to assemble an adequate database on which studies of past ENSO events could be used as broad indicators of probable future consequences (c). Though improved forecasting ability and longer lead times will bring opportunities for more active countermeasures.

These and other factors (d) will complicate and possibly render ineffective efforts planned simply on the basis of expected ENSO conditions and the developing intensity of the event. We are now seeing that this will not be enough in many countries where political pressures and maneuvering can dominate the decisions made. The Latin American report has shown us that we face a much more complex decision-making process. Where does the international community stand on such issues? And how can they be resolved in the interests of the affected populations? Answers to these and related questions will have to be found.

--Peter Rogers

Peter Rogers spent most of his professional career in the Secretariat of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) where, from 1967 until 1984, he was principally responsible for the WMO Tropical Cyclone Programme. He is now based in Bangkok.