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Good Governance in Post Disaster Recovery: Case Study of Barrack Alpen II / PUSKORINFO Aceh - Indonesia

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Good Governance in Post Disaster Recovery:
Case Study of Barrack Alpen II / PUSKORINFO Aceh - Indonesia

Presented jointly by

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1 Introduction

There was a long period of conflict in the Province of Aceh as a result of the separation movement. In this situation, administration in the *kabupaten* (District) of Aceh Barat could not be carried out normally. According to Mr. Cut Agam - Vice Speaker and Chairman of DPRK (Local Legislature) of Aceh Barat, most projects conducted in rural areas, outside Meulaboh City (capital of Aceh Barat) were not effective, and never managed to achieve their targets successfully - as they were hampered by the separation movement. It was in this time of uncertainty, threat to security and orderliness, and already paralyzed performance of the District Government, that the earthquake and tsunami disaster hit Aceh, on December 26, 2004.

The tsunami destroyed the coastal region, and affected areas 3-5 kms further inland. The 384-km long road that ran along the west coast, from Banda Aceh (capital of Aceh Province) to the south eastern territories of the province, was badly damaged. The alignment was no longer recognizable and parts of the road had disappeared, washed away - severing the connection to affected cities in the south-eastern segment of Aceh Province, including Meulaboh which is about 250 kms from Banda Aceh.

As of January 27, 2005, data collected indicated that about 240,000 people had been lost to the tsunami - buried, killed or missing. The total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from cities and districts along the coastal areas of Aceh Province stood at 436,820 (equivalent to about 130,527 households)[1].

Located on the west coast of Aceh Province, Kabupaten Aceh Barat (the District of Aceh Barat) spreads over an area of 2,426 sq. kms. and consists of 11 *Kecamatans* (Sub-districts). Of these, the ones worst-affected by the tsunami were Meureubo, Samatiga, Arongan Lambalek, Bubon and Johan Pahlawan district, where Meulaboh (the capital city) is located.

In the Aceh Barat District, the tsunami destroyed 14 bridges (which is all bridges along the main road), 2 clinics, and 99 school units (from kindergartens to senior high schools), killing 185 teachers. All the sub-district (government/ municipal) offices needed to be rebuilt.

In February 2005, the population of Aceh Barat District stood at 198,541; most of them, farmers, fishermen, traders or small businessmen, by occupation. As many as 12,794 people had died in the tsunami, and the number of survivors at 56 temporary shelters (tents/ barracks) was recorded as 31,077.[2] According to the Command Base of Coordination Unit for Disaster Tackling Execution[3], a provincial-level emergency response co-ordination unit in Meulaboh, total IDP figures had reached about 61,000 people, including those staying at their relatives and outside Aceh Barat.[4]

Under pressure of the conflict, the District Government of Aceh Barat was slow to respond in days following the disaster. However by early January 2005, the *Bupati* ad-interim (Head of Sub-districts) and other officials had got together and consolidated their efforts. In keeping with Disaster Management Regulations, they, along with the TNI (Indonesian Army), responded to the emergency by - helping the wounded, evacuating displaced persons, burying the corpses and cleaning up the city (settlements). They coordinated with other aid agencies in providing logistical support, supplying food, medicines and fuel, as well as constructing temporary bridges and roads. The various donor institutions and international NGO's played a significant role, especially in ensuring food supplies, first-aid and health-care.

Given the local government's limited resources, the challenge was to improve its capacity in serving the community better. Some agencies worked with local authorities by sending in experts to help with problem-solving and service delivery improvements. However, only few providers (i.e. NGOs or donor programs) coordinated with sub-district offices, while most others did not. Even after the emergency response phase, support services such as technical assistance for community-based village mapping, housing or livelihood benefits, were delivered directly to communities, through the *Keuchik/ Kepala Desa* (Village Head).

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[1] [Vebry, 2006]
[2] [Ensiklopedia Aceh Barat, 2005]
[3] [*Pos Komando Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksanaan Penanggulangan Bencana*]
[4] [KOMPAS, 04/02/2005]

As per its mandate, UN-OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), carried out coordination activities during the emergency response period. While it was finding its feet, there was a time when the public officials seemed to be unresponsive and ineffective in dealing with information flowing in. In a situation where information was not easily available, the coordination media became an effective tool for the implementation of NGO programs, but did not play the same kind of facilitative role in aiding the local government function as a coordinating agent.

There were donor programs (relating to governance) that were faced with this issue of sketchy, imprecise information, and were able to remedy it both at district and sub-district levels. PUSKORINFO is one such success story.

The scope of support in rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts was extensive, but two sectors requiring immediate attention were 1) housing and 2) livelihood. Livelihood programs were not considered instantly, as it was felt that they could be worked out directly between the providers and beneficiaries when they met. The matter of housing was complicated, with problems arising from issues relating to land (i.e. law, administration, provision etc), planning, construction and systematic allocation or distribution.

The next four Chapters (II – V) describe our study. Chapter II illustrates the situation after the disaster, dealing specifically with housing issues and provision to the IDPs. It describes the roles and efforts of the various institutions/ agencies involved in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. Chapter III discusses the USAID-LGSP initiatives with Barrack Alpen II and concludes with the establishment of PUSKORINFO (Center for Coordination and Information, at the district level). Chapter IV evaluates the result and achievements, and includes a discussion on the trend and sustainability of the activity of PUSKORINFO in Aceh Barat. Chapter V reflects on lessons learned and the transferability of PUSKORINFO and good governance practices in this case.

2 Situation before the Initiative

[3rd Quarter of 2005 to 2nd Quarter of 2006)]

2.1 IDPs and Housing Assistance

Survivors, whose houses were destroyed by the tsunami, became internally displaced persons (or IDPs), who either stayed within the village, moved in with their relatives or friends at the same sub-district, or possibly shifted to Medan (capital of North Sumatra Province, nearest to the Province of Aceh) or even to Jakarta (capital of Indonesia on Java Island).

In relation to land and housing, some of the IDPs were owners and others paid rent. Regarding the status of houses, few had proper land certificates and papers, while others had none. Land parcels were either not properly registered earlier, or if there were supporting documents, they were lost with the tsunami. Most cases were houses without clearly defined plot boundaries. In some instances, constructions were unauthorized or land was illegally occupied (living as squatters). Thus from a legal and administrative point of view, verification and sanction, was not easy.

Meanwhile, continuing in the same manner of operation from the emergency response phase, the housing providers directly contacted beneficiaries through the Village Head. Successful housing delivery required a certain amount of committed collaboration between the two sides.

At this stage, the issue of appropriately and precisely identifying the community's needs was encountered. Officials from The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR)[5] were consulted and this matter raised at the coordination meeting conducted at the district level. Nevertheless, manipulations and discrepancies occurred. Various members of a family made requests for housing to different providers. It became more complicated in cases where providers had no references in granting housing to newly married IDP couples, or where the children wished to divide the land of their parents' previous house. There was also an argument for having more than one dwelling unit for each family, as some of the house sizes (being provided)[6] were not suitable to accommodate the number of persons in the family.

Houses were to be provided according to the status of the IDPs, under the following categories:

1) The renters - these families were not eligible to receive a new house, they were limited to have funding support for housing rehabilitation;

2) The owners - each family could have a new house, on their original plot of land or nearby in the same village;

3) The owners - those who had agreed to relocate to another area, which might be outside their village or even the sub-district, were also entitled to a new house.

In general, relocating IDPs could mean from the tents/ temporary shelters to barracks or from barracks to permanent houses. However this report specifically discusses the relocation of IDPs from barracks to their permanent houses.

Of the 37,233 houses in Aceh Barat, 13,740 units (37%) were badly wrecked and 2,473 units (6.64%) were lightly or moderately damaged. 5,240 families lived in temporary shelters at 47 points.[7]

Over time, the pace of resettlement in Aceh Barat has indicated acceleration. In 2005, the rate of construction and provision of houses was about 1.5% of the housing demand, climbing to 21% in 2006 and 39% by May 2007 (Refer table below). This includes housing provided by the BRR, various donor programs and NGOs.

No.	Year	2005	Units	2006	Units	May 2007	Units
1	Production	80	Units	1,111	Units	4,189	Units
2	Rate	20	Units/month	93	Units/month	838	Units/month

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[5] [Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh-Nias]
[6] [House sizes differed from one provider to the other]
[7] [PUSKORINFO, *Bappeda*, Aceh Barat, Nov. 2006]

This increase was because the number of groups involved in construction and rehabilitation efforts grew over time, and also access to land (for housing) improved. However the yet unaddressed problem, concerning the lack of consolidated and accurate data on the eligibility and rights of IDPs, requirement of houses, their locations etc, hampered the allocation process.

By mid-2005, the housing providers had begun to allocate houses. Some people were unhappy with the distribution of houses, as they felt it was unjust. For instance, while many IDPs were still waiting for their housing units, several others with fewer problems had already got one. Some severely destroyed areas received less attention as compared to others with only light or minor damage.

The District Government was aware of the situation, but there was little initiative towards compiling a precise record of information relating to IDPs that needed houses, and their intention to stay in the area or relocate. Should the IDPs agree to be relocated, the government had not yet worked out where and how they could provide the land. As such the housing providers had little or no reference base from where to conduct housing reconstruction and distribution.

Head of *Bappeda* (District Development Planning Agency of Aceh Barat), Mr. Minzar Wood and his colleague, Head of Research and Information, recalled the early rehabilitation situation in Aceh Barat, as follows:

- In the beginning, the UN, Donor Agencies and NGOs at the tsunami-affected areas, directly met the communities and offered their assistance or started support programs; and they did so individually. Efforts to coordinate among the housing donors/ providers were conducted through the Shelter Working Group Meetings.

- Observing developments on site, the District Government in a way felt alienated, and at a loss. An evaluation indicated that construction activities (on the ground) were not based on priority. Critical areas of work or urgent needs were not yet handled, while other, less pressing issues already had ample support. If this state of affairs was not promptly rectified, it would certainly discredit the local government and lead to increasing tensions among the communities.

- UN-ORC (United Nations Office for Recovery Coordination) was in the capacity to support the various NGOs and Donor Agency Programs. However, the need for more effective coordination in their direct dealing with the IDPs, was obvious.

In February 2006, the District Government of Aceh Barat acquired a 53-ha parcel of land, for the purpose of relocation. This did not go down well with the local community, and particularly the IDPs, as the government had done so independently, without consulting the public, or bothering to find out their needs and aspirations.

2.2 The Institutional Condition

District Government agencies involved in providing housing to the IDPs were, the Executing Unit for Disaster Tackling[8] (SATLAK-PB), *Bappeda* and *Dinas Cipta Karya* (District Government unit of Public Works on Housing and Settlement). Support from UN-OCHA and later by UN-ORC was significant in conducting Shelter Working Group Meetings in Aceh Barat. Deliberations mostly revolved around:

- Settlement on any overlaps between the new housing areas of the providers;

- Discussions on land suitability for new constructions;

- Resolving cases of dispute between the communities and providers, or antagonized relationships within the community that was affecting the donor's performance.

Bappeda and *Dinas Cipta Karya* were actively involved in these meetings. Their role in particular involved, providing planning advice and arranging the venue for meetings. However at the time, this forum was not utilized to discuss openly either the government's intention to acquire the 53-ha land for relocation, or thereafter, respond to the community's unfavorable opinion regarding the same. Discontentment was at its peak when they realized that the land also had a technical problem, and

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[8] [*Satuan Pelaksana Penanggulangan Bencana*]

was not suitable for developing a housing area. Later on it also became known that the price, at which land was acquired, was too high as compared to what was offered to the communities in direct negotiations. The government price ceiling had to be lowered thereafter.

Continuing from the emergency response phase, the SATLAK-PB carried out registration and updating of IDP data, by recording the number of buried victims and evacuees. A national level organization, with working units at all levels of government, its existence, role and function is regulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs Decree No. 131, Year 2003 on Guideline for Disaster Tackling and Handling the IDPs.

SATLAK-PB had obtained IDP information from the Electronic Data Processing Agency[9] of Aceh Province. These statistics had been copied and distributed to the Sub-districts for verification. However due to the lack of resources and supervision at the Sub-districts, there was no response to the initiative and the data was not corroborated.

As such, the available or useable information concerning the status of IDPs was based on early 2005 data, which was neither accurate nor up-to-date. This problem resulted in less reliability and accountability when it came to the allocation of houses to IDPs. Even the communities had no clear information or idea of where to convey their grievances on housing provision.

The above situation needed to be dealt with and sorted out quickly. On June 20, 2006, the late *Bupati* ad-interim of Aceh Barat, Dr. Sofyanis issued a decree for constituting the Coordination Team for IDPs Handling and Housing Construction for Victims of Earthquake and Tsunami in the District of Aceh Barat[10] This team had the responsibility to:

- conduct IDP registration and update the number of houses needed;

- provide counsel in identifying problems and finding solutions, as it may occur on site;

- provide necessary guiding information to the donor agencies and NGOs;

- evaluate and report activities to the Bupati.

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[9] [*Badan Pengolahan Data Electronik*]
[10] [*Tim Koordinasi Penanganan Pengungsi dan Pembangunan Perumahan bagi Korban Gempa dan Tsunami, Kabupaten Aceh Barat*]

3 Initiative and Recovery Actions towards Good Governance

[4th Quarter of 2005 - 3rd Quarter of 2006]

The *Bupati* decree to form a Coordination Team was a step in the right direction, towards a more efficient handling of IDPs and their housing provision. In June 2006, the activities of some agencies were synchronized and their efforts consolidated, to improve coordination and information management in the District of Aceh Barat.

The District Government's responses and initiatives in dealing with post-tsunami issues were satisfactory. Some failures could be attributed to insufficient resources. Prompt actions such as forming the SATLAK-PB, coordination with the Indonesian Army (TNI) and police, involving the Provincial Government of Aceh, the Minister for Social Affairs, and creating a forum for information gathering through volunteers and NGOs, were all aimed at effective disaster management.

Donor agencies or support programs operating in Aceh Barat after the emergency response period were not limited only to IDP rehabilitation. Some of them were related to capacity-building and governance.

3.1 USAID-LGSP Initiatives and Response for Alue Penyareng II Barrack (Barrack Alpen II)

USAID-LGSP (Local Governance Support Program) is funded by USAID. Its core functions were in the field of planning and budgeting, capacity building of councilors, facilitating and supporting community organization, and mass media initiatives. These capacities were utilized to support the District Government's priorities, which were formulated at a planning workshop. Involving multiple stakeholders, this workshop was intended as a need-assessment exercise for developing better governance practices.

On October 1, 2005, a decision was taken to improve service delivery to IDPs through the establishment of a -

- Center for Relocation Services, and

- Initiate programs to improve local economic development, in particular the community's access to working capital.

These activities were demand-driven. For each of these projects, a detailed working plan was prepared along with the related *Dinas* (organization unit of the District Government). Strategies for local economic development were prepared by *Bappeda, Dinas Perdagangan and Perindustrian dan Koperasi* (District Government unit for Trade, Industry and Cooperative) of Aceh Barat. The working plan for establishing a Center for Relocation Services was designed in consultation with *Bappeda*, *Dinas Cipta Karya* and SATLAK-PB. This was completed and ready for implemented in January 2006. Part of the arrangement between USAID-LGSP and the District Government of Aceh Barat was that both parties would share an office and equipment for the Center.

Dealing with the issue of relocation was complicated as each agency or unit working in the area, were doing so by themselves. There was little coordination or planning, and at that time the BRR was still more focused on policy-making and budgeting.

The community's extreme displeasure with regard to the earlier acquisition of land was a big blow to the District Government's standing. For USAID-LGSP, this experience only reinforced the fact that in order to facilitate and successfully carry out relocation activities, it was essential to tune into the needs and aspirations of the community.

After directly interacting with the IDPs and gaining a better understanding of their requirements, the role and function of the Centre for Relocation Services became clearer. In the relocation process, 'transparency' was of the essence.

3.2 Understanding the Relocation Process: Case of Barrack Alpen II

Chosen out of 42 Barracks in Aceh Barat, USAID-LGSP first made contact with Barrack Alpen II (located at Desa Ujong Tanah Darat, Sub-district of Meureubo) in October 2005. Abdussalam, the Barrack Coordinator discussed the problem of uncertainty in housing provision by the government.

It was noted that this barrack management had a good reputation in catering to its residents' needs. The inhabitants of Barrack Alpen II were accustomed to discussing and finding solutions in a participatory manner. Small meetings were facilitated by the Barrack's management whenever important issues arose. Their consensus was presented at the general meetings, where all residents were invited. The management had got the women to participate in the decision-making. An instance of a case resolved in this manner was the provision of clean water for residents using a shallow well and cleaning the barrack's yard (ensuring the availability and reliability of water supply). In the relocation planning process, the community was actively engaged in determining the site plan and location of public facilities.

IDPs living at Barrack Alpen-II were a cohesive community with good a management structure. However in other cases, where such a foundation was lacking, a citizen's forum needed to be established.

Steps in this community-based relocation process were:

1. Data Verification

An important first step in the process was the verification of beneficiary data, and to ascertain who wanted to be relocated.

2. People's Agreement

The People's Agreement was a show of the community's commitment; to be signed on legal format.

3. Establishing a Committee of Relocation

A Committee for Relocation was elected by the community through participatory means. This committee was in charge of managing the relocation process.

4. Land Identification (by the Community)

The Committee for Relocation was responsible for land identification. In the case of Barrack Alpen-II, some options were identified and their suitability evaluated. Finally, a parcel of land not too far away and adjacent to an existing road was settled upon through common consensus.

5. Land and Subsurface Soil Investigation

Some technical aspects relating to the land were analyzed. Soil composition and structure was studied using the Dutch Cone Sounding (SONDIR) technique and drilling boreholes. The possibility of floods was also examined. A basic infrastructure needs assessment, and an environmental impact analysis was carried out. That is, access roads, electricity, drainage, fresh water resource, spatial planning, and the potential for further expansion to accommodate other housing communities, were all looked into. To end with, the socio-economic aspect (neighboring communities/ villages and access to - sustainable livelihoods, basic education for children, markets, health-care facilities, places of worship etc) was also assessed.

6. Negotiations on Land Price

In the case of Barrack Alpen-II, the community was able to negotiate a land price for only Rp. 6,500 per square meter - significantly lower than the government's standard price for land acquisition in the same village, which was more than Rp. 15,000 per square meter. After the price and the process of land acquisition were published in the local newspaper, the government standard price came down to Rp. 10,000 per square meter.

7. Site Planning

Based on his experience as a building contractor, Mr. Abdussalam (head of Barrack Alpen II), prepared a blueprint for their housing settlement - the outcome of a participatory planning exercise involving the community. USAID-LGSP improved and digitized the plan, and facilitated this initiative with the BRR. A presentation and discussion was held on February 2, 2006, where the BRR stated that they would provide land for relocation.

The plot measuring 15 m x 20 m in size was subdivided into smaller sites, with a 7 m wide road and some common facilities like a playground, musholla (small mosque) etc. Which family got which lot was determined through a lottery. Every site was numbered and the head of the family picked a number. The blueprint was signed by the *Keuchik* (Head of Village) and *Camat* (Head of Sub-district) of Meureubo. The entire process was facilitated by USAID-LGSP and supported by two other USAID programs, the Environmental Support Program (ESP) and Health Service Program (HSP).

The scheme was submitted to *Bappeda*, requesting for an approval to build the houses on site. The feasibility report (prepared by World Vision) stated that the land was viable for relocation and housing purposes.

8. Land Administration

After all the documents were ready, the Committee for Relocation submitted its proposal to the *Bupati* for approval. Once this was received, the documents were presented to the National Land Agency[11] who carried out partial planning for detailed relocation. The Committee for Relocation then conducted negotiations with Committee 9 (consisting of 9 persons) for land acquisition.

In the Barrack Alpen-II case, the land owner had given a time limit for full payment - from January to May 2006. At the time, the Aceh Barat Government did not have a budget for land acquisition (no APBD - approved district budget) and the BRR was also unable to pay for it. The alternative for the community was to use their own resources. The residents received money from World Vision through a "cash-for-work" program, where 50% of their income was allocated for payment towards the relocation land.

Finally by the end of November 2006, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as one of the housing providers through the BRR program, called for tenders from contractors, to build the houses and infrastructure. Work on site began in January 2007 and is estimated to be completed by August 2007. What was important was that the residents of Barrack Alpen-II were given access to monitor the construction of their houses. Prior to this, a three-day training program was conducted by USAID-LGSP on how to supervise the process of housing construction. If the residents found some discrepancies between the plan and what transpired on site, they could directly contact ADB-ETESP (Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project) to submit their grievances regarding implementation of the contract.

3.2.1 Replication of Barrack Alpen-II

Activities of the Barrack Alpen-II community inspired other barracks at Meureubo Sub-district (in similar circumstances), to do the same. Residents of the other barracks agreed to assemble together and discuss the relocation issue. Mr. Abdussalam then took the initiative of inviting USAID-LGSP to facilitate these meetings.

In collaboration with teams from Alpen-I, Alpen Perumnas, Paya Peunaga-I and Paya Peunaga-II, the Meurebo Forum for Coordination of Relocation[12] was established; endorsed by a decree from the *Camat* (Head of Sub-district) of Meureubo.

Considering that housing issues were linked to the beneficiaries - who had to be differentiated from non-victims eligible for housing assistance - the housing providers needed to know precisely how many houses were required by the IDPs. The *Keuchik* and *Mukim* (Heads of Village) had to participate in determining how many residents were entitled to housing assistance. One of the main tasks of the forum was to verify such data.

Understanding that such an activity needed to be comprehensive, the network was extended to include all the Barrack Managements. On January 24, 2006, an assembly of 36 Barrack Managements in Aceh was held. This and other similar meetings were monitored or facilitated by USAID-LGSP. A growing involvement with the community helped the USAID-LGSP to gain a better understanding of the situation and housing provision problems. This network of Barrack Managements was continually expanded, and subsequently they succeeded in forming a district-level association of Barrack Managements (IPKTs).

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[11] [*Badan Pertanahan Nasional*]
[12] [*Forum Koordinasi Relokasi Meurebo*]

After establishing a citizens' forum in the Meureubo Sub-district, on August 30, 2006, the USAID-LGSP facilitated the creation of a district-level IDPs association in Aceh Barat. Citizen forums of all the different Barracks came together to form the Association for Tsunami Internally Displaced Persons[13] (IPKTs). This forum was expected to access the Center for Coordination and Information as a complaint center.

3.2.2 Center for Coordination and Information (PUSKORINFO)

Communication and coordination functions were actually introduced from an early time in the emergency response phase. On April 23, 2005, the *Bupati* ad-interim of Aceh Barat, Drs. H. Nasruddin, had formed the SATLAK-PB in accordance with the Home Affairs Ministerial Decree No. 131 Year 2003, on Guideline for Disaster Tackling and Handling the IDPs.

This unit was responsible for the rehabilitation and reconstruction process, but had limited resources in addressing all the issues involved. Various stakeholders in the District of Aceh Barat had determined at the start that the government needed to establish a Center for Relocation Services. This task force was expected to accelerate the rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs). A clear mechanism was required for efficient resettlement, and an anticipated issue complaint center to avoid similar mistakes from being repeated. Also, it was evident that the regional government needed an effective form of management to ensure better implementation in the future.

On the other hand, USAID-LGSP was fully aware that the IPKTs would need information support. Sooner or later it had to connect with government institutions in order to communicate and coordinate all related information, for better performance on housing delivery to the IDPs. So, having facilitated the formation of the IPKTs, the USAID-LGSP at the same time met with *Dinas Cipta Karya, Bappeda* and the BRR office at Meulaboh to summon their response on the matter of leading the coordination and information management concerning IDPs and housing delivery. By this time the USAID-LGSP also had a better picture of relocation issues - through their experience with Barrack Alpen II and monitoring of other Barrack Management meetings.

On July 30, 2006, USAID-LGSP, the heads of *Dinas Cipta Karya* and *Bappeda* got together for an in-depth discussion on:

- the need for data verification (in view of the fact that there were IDPs who got more than one house from different housing providers, while others received none; and other related issues such as housing provision to new IDP couples who married after the tsunami);

- the concept of establishing a Center for Coordination and Information (PUSKORINFO - *Pusat Koordinasi dan Informasi*), its role and functions;

- procuring equipment, training computer operators for database management and programming a database application; and

- the action plan.

On August 1-2, 2006, the Coordination Team (that came into existence by the *Bupati*'s decree), held a meeting with the heads of *Bappeda, Dinas Cipta Karya* and USAID-LGSP. The next day, USAID-LGSP confirmed its funding support for the soon-to-be PUSKORINFO. On August 3 2006, in a meeting facilitated by USAID-LGSP, it was agreed to establish PUSKORINFO as a joint secretariat on IDPs and resettlement planning. It was meant as a complementing apparatus to the Coordination Team, where the Head of *Bappeda* was made Team Coordinator and the Head of *Dinas Cipta Karya* was Chairman.

In the data collection process, initially the provincial government through the Electronic Data Management Agency[14] (BPDE) agreed to supply PUSKORINFO with a soft copy of the information, but later were only able to provide a hard copy. After procuring this information, a database training session was conducted for the operators (through collaboration between USAID-LGSP and AIPRD-LOGICA)[15]. The operators came from each of the different SKPD (District Government units) in Aceh

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[13] [*Ikatan Pengungsi dan Korban Tsunami*]

[14] [*Badan Pengelola Data Elektronik*]

[15] [Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development - Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh Project]

Barat (*Dinas/ Badan/ Kantor*). AIPRD-LOGICA provided resource persons, trainers and the database application.

Between August 18th and September 12th 2006, the operators had completed the data entry on IDPs. These statistics came from BPDE of Aceh Province, UN-ORC, and the Heads of Villages and Barracks. On September 13 2006, PUSKORINFO was ready to present this for public consultation and cross-checking of beneficiary data. Important points that needed to be verified were: overlapping data (where one person was recorded by more than one donor program/ NGO), manipulation of beneficiaries' data (husband, wife, and son, or daughter all submitted a request for housing assistance to different NGOs, whereas they only had the right to receive one house). Some of the NGO staff was also alleged to have manipulated some data. PUSKORINFO found that some beneficiaries' names had been finalized for delivery, though in reality the community had never heard of these names. What was achieved at the end of this exercise was a more precise record of: the number of IDPs needing housing assistance, the number of houses planned to be built in one village and, name of the housing provider. From the findings, it was also possible to learn who had received more than one house, who had not received any, and the number of houses without beneficiaries.

These results were published and made available to 128 *Keuchiks* (Head of Villages), *4 Camats* (Head of Sub-districts) and 42 barrack and tent managers (united through the IPKTs), and all the housing providers (from international agencies to local NGOs). In the introduction, the function and working mechanisms of PUSKORINFO were presented, along with an announcement that PUSKORINFO was equipped with a complaint desk to accept grievances on the housing delivery to IDPs.

After the launch of PUSKORINFO findings, and handling of complaints, USAID-LGSP and AIPRD-LOGICA actively worked on data verification. With its resources, AIPRD-LOGICA corroborated the information and directly updated the villages in its program, at the Sub-districts of Johan Pahlawan, Arongan Lambalek, Samatiga and Meureubo. In other Sub-districts, AIPRD-LOGICA facilitated the IPKTs to carry out the verification. This work of confirming facts and figures brought into sharper focus the priorities in housing construction. Needless to say, it increased accuracy as to the number of houses that needed to be provided, at the same time, allowing for correction in the allocation of houses already distributed.

PUSKORINFO supported the Coordination Team with information so that:

- the housing providers and other resource agencies involved in the redevelopment of Aceh Barat were aware of local priority issues for development;

- challenges and problems could be foreseen or resolved, based on similar experiences in the past. In this way PUSKORINFO helped to 'anticipate' better.

PUSKORINFO has now become a part of the Aceh Barat District Government. Today, it has changed in name and structure, because as a task force it would not have had any allocated budget from the Local Government Annual Budget (APBD)[16]. To keep PUSKORINFO running well, *Bappeda* has made it a part of *Bidang Informasi dan Penelitian*, under the SIPD[17] program. Now an institution with operating funds from *Bappeda*, PUSKORINFO is at the right place with the right funding source. The database format with information on housing provision is effective and can be used as reference.

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[16] [*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah*]
[17] [*Sistem Informasi dan Pendataan Daerah*]

4 Good Governance and Evaluation of the Achievement

4.1 Major Conclusions and Recommendations

a) Community-based participatory resettlement is more effective than relocation by the Government alone. The process is also more transparent and accountable. Involvement of the beneficiaries/ IDPs in the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities naturally accelerates the process.

b) The District Government of Aceh Barat showed good initiative towards the handling of IDP services. This is demonstrated in the formation of the SATLAK-PB and the Coordination Team to manage the relocation and housing construction for IDPs.

c) PUSKORINFO is a manifestation of good governance in the District of Aceh Barat. There were interactions between the government and citizens' forums, beneficiaries' lists were published transparently, data manipulation issues concerning housing provision were resolved, accountability was ensured and services for registration and dealing with complaints provided.

d) The government regulation on the process of land acquisition (Presidential Regulation No. 36 Year 2005) should be amended to include a committee for land price analysis.

e) The regional government's lack of knowledge and skill in disaster management was evident in the post-tsunami situation. It is recommended that a capacity-building plan and program be developed for regional/ local government officials and non-government stakeholders.

f) Technical assistance should be provided to the provincial government for preparing Local Strategic Plans for Disaster Mitigation and Management. It is suggested that international aid agencies give greater attention to such activities in their agendas.

4.2 The Good Governance Discussion on the Case

The principles that form the basis for good governance have been identified as sustainability, equity, efficiency, transparency, accountability, civic engagement, citizenship and security. These principles should be reflected in the institution's behavior, procedures, and outcomes.

4.2.1 PUSKORINFO

As an institution, PUSKORINFO has upheld the principles of good governance. Its information base is transparent and accessible to anyone; in turn leading to more accountability in actions. Its information comes from the housing stakeholders in the region - the providers (NGOs, Donor Programs, the BRR), and the beneficiaries (updates from the Heads of Villages and Barracks, building on previous counting that was delivered to the Provincial Government).

As a coordinating agency, it has support from all related *Dinas* (District Government units) to deal with complaints and proffer solutions. PUSKORINFO has a strategic function in the process of housing delivery to IDPs.

The challenge to this institution was its sustainability. Here the authorities responded by including it within the structural constitution of the Local Government. PUSKORINFO is part of an initiative towards accountability in housing delivery - to prevent inefficiency and malpractices in housing allocation.

4.2.2 Management of Barrack Alpen II

It was of significance that the community of Barrack Alpen II recognized the effectiveness of its management, which played a proactive role in resolving issues encountered by its residents and further determining their future. The management was alert to and aware of the issues faced, and these were tackled by involving the stakeholders in the decision-making process. This inclusiveness reflects civic engagement and brings about transparency.

On the other hand, good governance is also about how institutions exercise their authority. The Barrack Management was able to distinguish between situations where they were required to take decisions themselves, from cases where they should include the residents. In addition, the Management was sensitive to gender issues and women were given a voice in the decision-making.

4.2.3 Shelter Working Group Meeting/Forum

The international NGOs and housing providers found these meetings very effective in cross-checking the areas of their housing projects (and avoiding overlap), in its suitability, land status, etc. The effectiveness of the forum came from its transparency; where participants were free to open a case, convey information and accept comments.

These meetings were found to be ineffective when it came to dealing with the beneficiaries. Housing providers got a list but it was difficult to guarantee its reliability. There were no representatives of the beneficiaries at the meetings, either the *Keuchik* (Village Head) or its *Imuem Mukim* (Supervisor). The donors/ NGOs usually met with them directly to procure information, but their absence reduced the efficacy of the conference. Also, discussions were limited to the effectiveness of NGO/ Donor Programs in the region and issues like the Government's intention to acquire land for relocation were never addressed in these meetings. The Government had failed to recognize the potential of such a forum.

4.2.4 District Government

The tsunami hit Indonesia before other areas, and Aceh was the first to experience its devastating impact. Considering the pressure and threats to the Government pre- and post-disaster, one finds that progress is taking place.

With PUSKORINFO, the need for a coordinated effort was fulfilled. It has been a useful tool in reaching out more effectively and carrying out relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in a coordinated manner.

5 Lessons Learnt and Transferability

5.1 Lessons Learned

a) The SATLAK-PB had made attempts at data verification, after receiving the initial information from the Provincial Government. But PUSKORINFO was able to affect better responses from Village Heads and group leaders (and subsequently update this data), when they published the information on the number of houses constructed and names of beneficiaries in each village, and directly distributed them to the *Keuchik* (Head of Village).

Rationale:

- The Sub-district offices were poorly supported with funds and know-how to do the verification;

- Data verification did not directly influence the interest of the Sub-district officials. It was a big issue for those treated unjustly with the housing delivery 'system'.

- PUSKORINFO carried out the verification with updated data from the Barracks Association (IPKTs) and a report from the Village Head - with whom the IDPs had a closer association. PUSKORINFO provided a platform for the IDPs to express their concerns, register complaints and follow-up on actions taken.

Lessons Learned:

- The right motivation and individual interest is more critical for effectiveness of initiatives.

- The strategy to launch PUSKORINFO by publishing its findings and its role in the process, is in itself an example of transparency in processes.

- In order to have effective governance, the stakeholder has to have access to government initiatives in planning, implementing and monitoring the results of those actions. Only then can governance be said to be based on a responsive, participatory, transparent and accountable way of conduct.

b) Upto January 2006, it was clear that in the relocation process, donor programs and NGOs would provide houses and the District Government would provide land (either with or without the support of the BRR). However the methodology adopted in the actual relocation process was suspect. Therefore USAID-LGSP took the step of facilitating the process of relocation planning and implementation through the formation of organized stakeholder groups amongst the affected people. This also improved information dissemination, critically needed in facilitating housing delivery to the IDPs.

Rationale:

- In this issue of housing delivery to IDPs, all stakeholder groups were aware of their commitments, role and functions. Dissatisfaction on the part of the IDPs was primarily because they were not consulted in issues which affected their future and safety.

- Clarity satisfies stakeholders Clarity means exposing the details, objectively and reasonably.

- At the same time, facilitating/ or getting the IDPs to organize themselves was an action of strengthening one of the most important stakeholders involved - the beneficiaries.

Lessons Learned:

- It is important to keep commitments once made and stay the course of work. Once preliminary information was given out, it was essential to provide detailed information from time to time; and finish the activity in totality once the commitment was made.

- All stakeholders involved should interact in a transparent manner. This is important in building trust and improving the quality of governance.

c) The effectiveness of the USAID-LGSP's observation on the process of relocation and IDPs issues during the process, was a result of the proper data obtained for developing its information system. This would not have happened if there were a general environment of suspicion. It is important to be open to improving the program and initiatives in future. Further effective involvement of stakeholders is also essential for any innovation to take place.

d) Before PUSKORINFO was established, there were tsunami survivors who did not get the assistance they deserved; survivors in less dire need received more attention. Moreover, there were indications that some parties took advantage of the assistance given. After PUSKORINFO was launched, the possibility of malpractices was reduced significantly. This shows that a (good) information system is a prerequisite for the implementation of just and accountable governance.

e) Openness, good intentions and sincerity will give way to improvement. Threats to discredit other parties are quite frequent, that is why the discourse should be proportional. A balance between the willingness to accept reality and its causes should be reached. All of these are dependent upon the atmosphere created by the decision-makers at the highest level in the regency of southwest Aceh.

f) In the assistance program, effective capacity will be based on careful identification of suitable beneficiaries. Only after the parties are known can the empowerment begin - be introduced, trained and improved.

5.2 Transferability

Based on the above discussion, the PUSKORINFO process can be replicated under the following conditions:

a) When stakeholders have the openness to share and work together to improve the future.

b) Stakeholders are aware of the assets of each faction or group – who is stronger in knowledge, authority, resources etc. The recognition of one's ability and role will facilitate the implementation.

c) Technically, the replication of PUSKORINFO is easy because the software is easily available and the basic data can still be accessed from those still working in Aceh. What needs to be done is to increase funds and establish the database in each regency/ district and appoint human resources for various roles. The stakeholders can follow the manual as it is, and there is the opportunity for changes in accordance with the local condition. AIPRD-LOGICA used PUSKORINFO's software in one of their data entry trainings for Sub-district staff; after which the trainees can verify and update the data on housing for tsunami displaced persons. PUSKORINFO at *Bappeda* has become the database for regency's activities with regard to grievances management and coordination in the construction of houses and infrastructure.

6 Glossary/Abbreviations

ADB - Asian Development Bank

ADB-ETESP - (Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project), an ADB Project to support Aceh, post-tsunami and earthquake

AIPRD-LOGICA - Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development - Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh Project

Barrack Alpen II or **Alpen** II - short term/abbreviation for Alue Penyareng II barrack, referred to residents of a temporary IDPs shelter, in the sub-district of Meurebo in Aceh Barat

APBD - *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah*, Local Government Annual Budget

Banda Aceh - the Capital City of Aceh Province

Bappeda - *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah*, Local Government (District) Agency for Development Planning

Kepala Bappeda, Head of District Agency for Development Planning

Kepala Bagian Penelitian dan Informasi, Bappeda, Head of Research and Information at Bappeda,

BPDE-Provinsi Aceh - *Badan Pengolahan Data Electronic - Provinsi Aceh*, Agency for Electronic Data Management, of Aceh Province.

BPN - *Badan Pertanahan Nasional*, National Land Agency

Bupati **-** Lord Mayor of a *Kabupaten* (District/Regency)

BRR - *Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh-Nias* (The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency for Aceh and Nias) , an national agency formed by Presidential Decree for Aceh and Nias post tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Camat - title for Head of a Sub-district

"Cash-for-work" - an amount of funds (from an institution) allocated to some individuals / community for an agreed of activity.

Dinas Cipta Karya **-** District Government Unit of Public Works on housing and settlement issues.

DPRK Aceh Barat - *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Kabupaten* of Aceh Barat, the district council of Aceh Barat

Desa Ujong Tanah Darat - Village of Ujong Tanah Darat in the Sub-district of Meureubo.

Ensiklopedia Aceh Barat - a website on Aceh Barat.

Forum Koordinasi Relokasi Meurebo - Meurebo Forum of Coordination of Relocation.

IDP - Internally Displaced Person

International NGOs – Non-Governmental Organization with international wide operation.

IPKTs - *Ikatan Pengungsi dan Korban Tsunami*, literary means Association of the IDPs and Tsunami Victims/Survivors - comprise of Association of Barrack Managements formed in Aceh Barat. This association is expected to access the Center for Information and Communication as a complaint center at District Level.

Jakarta - Capital City of Indonesia in Java Island about 2¾ hour by jet from Banda Aceh

Kabupaten **-** District/Regency, a sub-provincial local government at district level

Kabupaten **Aceh Barat** - District of Aceh Barat

Kecamatan **-** Sub-district

Sub-district of Meureubo - a sub-district in *Kabupaten* Aceh Barat

Samatiga - a sub-district in *Kabupaten* Aceh Barat

Arongan Lambalek - a sub-district in *Kabupaten* Aceh Barat

Bubon - a sub-district in *Kabupaten* Aceh Barat

Johan Pahlawan is a sub-district in *Kabupaten* Aceh Barat where the Capital City of *Kabupaten* Aceh Barat is located

Keuchik - title for Head of Village in Aceh

Kepala Desa - generic title for Head of Village in Indonesia

Kepala Bappeda - Head of District Agency for Development Planning

Kepala Bagian Penelitian dan Informasi, Bappeda - Head of Research and Information at Bappeda

Keputusan Bupati tentang Tim Koordinasi Penanganan Pengungsi dan Pembangunan Perumahan bagi Korban Gempa dan Tsunam,i **Kabupaten Aceh Barat -** *Bupati* Decree on Coordination Team for IDPs Handling and Housing Construction for IDPs of Earthquake and Tsunami in District Aceh Barat, issued on June 20, 2006 in Aceh Barat.

KOMPAS - an Indonesian national daily newspaper

Masa Tanggap Darurat - emergency response phase

Medan - Capital of North Sumatra the nearest province to Aceh.

Meulaboh - the Capital City of Aceh Barat resides at Johan Pahlawan Sub District

MoU Helsinki - a Memorandum of Understanding between Republic of Indonesia with GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - Free Aceh Movement) on peaceful settlement, signed on August 15, 2005

NGOs - Non Governmental Organizations

Pejabat Bupati - Acting *Bupati, Bupati* ad-interim

Pemerintah Provinsi - The Provincial Government

Pengungsi - In Displaced People (IDPs)

Perpres 36 tahun 2005 - Peraturan Presiden No. 36 Tahun 2005, President Regulation No.36 Year 2005 on Land Provision for Public Infrastructure

PLN - *Perusahaan Listrik Negara*, State Electricity Company.

Posko Satkorlak Penaggulangan Bencana Alam - *Pos Komando Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksanaan Penanggulangan Bencana*, Command Base of Coordination Unit for Disaster Tackling Execution, an emergency response coordination unit at provincial level

Provinsi Aceh - Aceh Province.

PUSKORINFO - *Pusat Koordinasi dan Informasi*, Center for Information and Coordination (for IDPs issues and housing)

SATLAK-PB - *Satuan Pelaksana Penanggulangan Bencana,* Taskforce for Executing Disaster Handling, an emergency response unit working at district level

Sekber - *Sekretariat Bersama,* Joint Secretariat of Local Government and BRR for planning, implementing and monitoring rehabilitation and reconstruction post tsunami in Aceh Barat.

SIPD - *Sistem Informasi dan Pendataan Daerah*, Local Government (District) System on Data and Information

SKPD - *Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah*, Working Unit of Local Government Apparatus, a generic term for the working unit/office/agency/institution in local government organization.

TNI - *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian Army

Tata Kepemerintahan yang Baik - good governance, a condition of governance at sufficient quality of conduct that base on (at least) transparent, responsive, accountable manners.

UNOCHA - United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNORC - United Nations Office for Recovery Coordination, an office continuing the UNOCHA function on post emergency response phase.

USAID-ESP - United State Agency for International Development - Environmental Support Program, technical assistance funded by USAID on supporting environmental development in Indonesia.

USAID-HSP - United State Agency for International Development - Health Support Program, technical assistance funded by USAID on supporting health development in Indonesia.

USAID-LGSP - support program for governance, funded by USAID.

Wakil Bupati - Vice *Bupati*

World Vision – an international Non-Governmental Organization of USA.

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