DISASTER AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN AID. Neil Middleton and Phil O’Keefe, Pluto Press, London, 1998. ISBN 0-7453-1224-1, xii + 185 pages. Price $18.95.

It was the CIA in 1994-95 that helped set up the Taliban, the infamous rulers of Afghanistan who later harbored the Al-Qaeda network, say the authors of Disaster and Development, although the Pakistani intelligence service masterminded that project. The CIA’s belief was that the Taliban might bring stability to Afghanistan, a pre-condition for the American energy giant Unocal to construct a pipeline from Azerbaijan through Afghanistan to the Pakistani coast, they further elaborate. The project of establishing and strengthening the Taliban was not the only one of its kind. There are dozens of societies which have been devastated by civil wars and conflicts, promoted by colonial and neo-colonial powers to control world markets and enhance trade liberalization. Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan are discussed as case studies in this regard. 

The term “complex emergencies” has been coined to create confusion and hide political reasons behind the creation of violent conflicts and civil wars in various countries. However, relationships between conflicts in different parts of the world and neo-colonial agenda could be easily established, assert the authors. The human catastrophes in Rwanda, Sudan and other countries were products of processes either engendered by external powers or adopted by ruling elites to plunder these countries’ resources, in many cases promoted in the guise of ethnic and racial tensions, which provided cover to the interests of corrupt ruling elites and their external patrons. 

Disaster and Development provides a perceptive analysis of linkages between the policies of former colonial and neo-colonial countries, e.g., Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the USA and Russia, to expand their markets and extract resources from various countries, and the creation and protraction of conflicts. It also methodically demonstrates how designs of the three “devils” of globalization – the IMF, World Bank and WTO – to serve the agenda of their patron economies, contribute to chronic and “sudden” disasters through establishment of free market and trade liberalization regimes. 

However, the most important argument put forward by the authors is about the role of INGOs (international non-governmental organisations) and humanitarian agencies. Their role is not non-political and non-partisan as they commonly perceive and claim. The authors hold that most INGOs are neither honest nor courageous enough to accept the political nature of their work. They argue that INGOs have to be sensitive to the foreign policy agenda of their “home” governments and the moral and political agenda of their non-government sponsors. The political shades of INGOs’ humanitarian responses are many and varied. First, decisions on where and when to intervene are made on the basis of political, not humanitarian, concerns. Second, in many cases, INGO humanitarian assistance strengthens the control of repressive regimes and their allies. For example, when the RPA in Rwanda (Tutsi and Hutu opposition force) defeated the repressive FAR (army of the self-acclaimed Hutu-representative MRND regime) and the FAR took refuge in French-occupied territory, the UN and INGOs buttressed the genocidal regime with feeding programs in FAR-controlled refugee camps. On the other hand, the majority of people (already oppressed by FAR-MRND) were left unattended in RPA-controlled areas. Third, many INGOs advocate for not treating refugees as victims, but to recognize their resourcefulness and abilities and build upon them. However, without an appreciation of the political context, this approach could become a ploy for criminals and oppressors to further suppress their victims. A mockery was made of this approach in Rwanda when the repressive FAR-MRND militias took management control of the refugee camps under the disguise of a participatory approach and the war-affected refugees were treated mercilessly. Fourth, relief assistance is distributed through those very regimes and militias whose repressive policies are the main causes behind conflicts. In this way, the oppressors further marginalize their opponents and oblige the influential elite to win support for their policies. Fifth, INGOs, either under a compulsion to buy relief supplies from their “home” countries, or simply to exhaust relief funds, end up dumping large amounts of food and non-food items in disaster-affected areas, although such items are locally available. This approach destroys the local economy and affects local producers to the advantage of their sponsors.

The authors’ observations challenge claims by INGOs that their role in “complex emergencies” is always “apolitical” and that they are concerned with fulfilling higher imperatives of saving lives. While one is inclined to agree about the political nature of humanitarian projects, the importance of assistance in saving lives and reducing misery cannot be refuted or ignored, despite its political limitations.

As far as the creation of civil wars and human catastrophes in different countries is concerned, Middleton and O’Keefe’s argument seems to overemphasize the role of international political and economic determinants. It thus tends to undermine the significance of local social and political constituents of such conflicts. The authors have brought to the fore controversial, pertinent issues of development and conflict under the pretext of an alternative paradigm. However, in conclusion they are debilitated by the conventional approach, where they find themselves promoting linear and monocultural models of development, where solutions to problems of “underdevelopment” lie in following the treaded path of industrialized social democracies. If one is worried about the “dilemmas of development” in the “underdeveloped” world, then this book will provide a welcome analysis. Journalists, NGO and INGO workers, students of civil conflicts and peace studies, diplomats, intelligence agency officials and disaster response agencies will also find Disaster and Development informative and interesting.

Zubair Murshed is a Training Manager a ADPC.